

NGTL System

CUSTOMER OPERATIONS MEETING

APRIL 20, 2023

FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY

Welcome and Thank You for Joining Us

Participating via WebEx:

- Please sign-in through WebEx application including your full name and company
- To reduce background noise and improve audio quality, all WebEx participants will be placed on mute when entering the meeting
- Please submit your questions via using the raise hand function and coming off mute or the chat function and we will answer at the best possible opportunity



Safety Moment: Motorcycle Awareness

Spring is here– So are Motorcyclists!

- In 2021, over 200 motorcycle collisions in AB were reported, with 20 fatalities. Most common motorcycle collisions are:
 - Head-on collisions
 - Collisions with left-turning vehicles
 - Lane-Splitting
- “I didn’t see him/her.” Most collisions are the result of not seeing the motorcycle just prior to event.
- 80% of fatalities occurred in rural areas.

What can you do?

- Slow down! Slowing your speed by just 10km/h puts you in a better position to slow or stop in an emergency.
- Shoulder check when changing lanes. Motorcycles are small, nimble and sometimes quiet. Check twice before changing lanes.
- Leave yourself ample room and time when passing.
- Keep a safe distance from the vehicle/motorcycle ahead of you.
- Be mindful that a small fender-bender type accident can result in fatality for a motorcyclist.



NPS 42 North Central Corridor Pipeline Maintenance

Broad Area Restriction | Assessment Process



Step 1 Outage Assessment

- Constrained area is determined based on hydraulic analysis
- Restriction is required if flow is expected to exceed capability in the constrained area

Step 2 Restriction assessment process

- Applicable under the current system operations
- Applicable to broad area restrictions for most of outages in USJR

Assessment process - Flow chart



NPS 42 North Central Corridor – Pipeline Maintenance Overview

Location: Meikle River to Woodenhouse

Duration: April 25 to May 3rd

Capability communicated in DOP:



- USJR: 336 10⁶m³/d (11.9 Bcf/d) → 35e6 (1.2 Bcf/d) impact from base capability
 - Upstream Latornell: 208 10⁶m³/d (7.3 Bcf/d)
- NEDA: 120 10⁶m³/d (4.2 Bcf/d) → 17e6 (600 MMcf/d) impact from base capability

Service Allowable:

- 0% IT-R, 79% FT-R (Upstream of Latornell)
- 0% IT-D, 100% FT-D (NEDA)

Why is this outage significant?

- Distance: ~300 km of one continuous inline inspection
- Complexity:
 - Multiple Compressor Stations bypassed during the run and unable to operate
 - Duration
 - Runs will last over a day
 - Key egress path for USJR supply and key supply source for NEDA demand




*areas drawn for illustrative purposes



Upstream James River

Capability - Actual Flow - Historical Flow



This slide may not be accurate beyond April 19.
Please refer to the [DOP](#) on TC Customer Express for current outage information



NPS 42 NCC ILI – impact to USJR

Why did you restrict FT-R instead of first limiting EGAT IT-D?


Area of Impact and USJR Flow Distribution

- ~60% of USJR flows are upstream of Latornell
 - The 35 e6m3/d (1.2 Bcf/d) supply response must be in this area
- ~40% of USJR flows are downstream of Latornell
 - Supply response between Latornell and Clearwater would not be beneficial for this outage

Inadequate EGAT IT-D to safely manage the outage

- ~40 10⁶m³/d (1.4 Bcf/d) of EGAT IT-D leading into the outage
- EGAT IT-D would have to be reduced to levels below what is currently flowing in order to see the required supply response upstream of Latornell

Given high impact and smaller area (subset of USJR) there is insufficient downstream IT-D to safely manage the outage, therefore a localized area FT-R restriction is required.



*areas drawn for illustrative purposes

Oil Sands Delivery Area

■ Capability — Actual Flow — Historical Flow



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Please refer to the [DOP](#) on TC Customer Express for current outage information





NPS 42 NCC ILI – Impact to NEDA

The NPS 42 North Central Corridor Outage shows up in the NEDA/OSDA table; why was an FT-D cut not part of the bulletin?

- Operations Planning assesses capabilities on the system daily
- **Warm Weather/Lower NEDA Demand:** The NEDA demand has been at levels that provide us with more confidence that the outage can be managed without a service authorization change.
- **Interconnect Assistance:** NGTL has worked with interconnects in the NEDA to provide assistance during this outage
- **Pre-positioning NEDA Area:** Entering the outage with the NEDA area “packed up”, i.e. with high delivery pressures, allowing flexibility to draft the area out before a further service adjustment is required
- **Risks that could change service authorization:** Unplanned facility outages and/or increased NEDA demand

NGTL continues to monitor NEDA. If a service authorization change is required to manage the safe operation of the pipeline a bulletin will be issued.



*areas drawn for illustrative purposes



CONTACTS



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